On the shock of civil war: cultural trauma and national identity in Finland and Ireland by Kissane, Bill
On the Shock of Civil War: Cultural Trauma and National Identity  in 
Finland and Ireland. 
Bill Kissane, 
Department of Government, 
London School of Economics 
 
            I question whether any serious civil war ever does end. 
 T.S. Eliot 1947. 
 
Civil  war   divides the    nation. Those who pose the question    of     how   
society     recovers  afterwards         consider the   challenges as those 
of     reconstruction and  reconciliation. There  is  less  work on the      
role    of  national identity in  these    processes. Is     re-integration   of 
the losers   possible   on  the   basis of   an  existing national   identity,  
or     does  a  new    identity  have to  be     found? If  the  former,  what  
has  to     change to  make   that  original identity  more     inclusive of 
both sides? Much     depends  on   narratives  of   conflict.  I    explain 
why   the     Finnish    civil war of 1918  has  become  a unifying  ‘cultural 
trauma’  for the Finns, whereas the Irish civil war    of 1922-23 never 
became  the  dominant referent in    terms of national identity. The 
difference is explained by the greater shock  civil war posed   to Finnish 
national identity. 
 
 National Identity and the societal  meaning of  civil war. 
General   books  on    civil war  usually  begin with  two observations:   
civil wars   are increasingly common and they are   especially 
destructive. The   associations   with chaos   go back  to   ancient    
Greece  (González Calleja 2013:  13-14), the Romans lamented   their  
recurrent nature  (Armitage 2017: 69),     while  civil war has long been 
the ‘counter-concept’ to  the more progressive idea   of   revolution 
(Kissane 2016:  4). Civil war  is    a subject with an ancient past and a 
very  violent recent history.  
Given    the    generality of the    phenomenon, it is not surprising 
that  the    literature on  its consequences  should be   quantitative. One    
question is    how  civil wars  impact  on     economic development 
(Collier et al 2003). Their   effects on  public  health is another 
(Ghobarah, Huth, and   Russett 2003). The    stipulation  for  a  minimum     
threshold– usually  a   thousand   deaths – in the    very definition of 
civil war,  suggests that   the   amount of violence is   a reliable  guide 
to their destructiveness.   
One   effect of   this    empirical    rigour   is a neglect  of    ‘societal 
meaning’:    the significance of a      conflict in a country’s history, in    
the   broader  historical  and  sociological    context  in  which it        
occurred, or   in  a larger  cycle  of conflicts  (Newman 2015:  9). For    
Newman         investigating societal meaning   requires ‘an  appreciation 
of     different  historical  and  social contexts’.  ‘As an expression of 
modernity’ (ibid: 3), contemporary    conflicts have     much  to   do  with   
the  consolidation,  contestation, and   disintegration  of    state  
authority across  the  world. Hence his  solution to  the question of  
societal meaning   reflects      the central  role of  the  state  in politics 
and the importance of   state-society relations.  
Yet    nationhood  also   matters.   One could          tell   the story 
of the   Second World War as one of geo-political  ambitions, 
battlefields and  resources. This     misses the fact that    in  many 
countries defeat in war  created  ‘an existential   crisis of    national 
sovereignty’,  revealing  the ‘deep fractures that lay beneath the 
surface of unity’. The   collapse of state   authority  posed questions 
about the meaning of the nation, a paradigm of unity dramatically  
problematized by internal   fractures that were ‘simultaneously’ 
murderous and pregnant with future political possibility’ (Mazower 
2013: 2). Consider   the  fighting   between   fascists     and partisans  in   
Northern Italy. Both   sides  felt they    represented  the whole of Italy 
and  accused  the  other side  of  dragging  the nation into  fratricidal 
struggle (Pavoni 2013:  271). 
Nationalism scholars (Centeno 2002; Hall and  Malešević 2013; 
Hutchinson 2017),  have   shown   that   warfare has  had  a    
transformative   effect    on  both  state  and   nation. They do not 
engage  with     civil war specifically. There are   criteria  which   
differentiate    civil  from  inter-state war. The  conflict must be     
internal. Civil  war is above all    a  crisis of  domestic  social   relations.  
And when   the  enemy  is      internal,  the  polarisation is  especially    
traumatic. Finally,  the   challenge  of reconciliation is   much  greater 
after civil war, since    the   armies cannot    retreat     behind     their   
borders.   As  the  Roman  historian   Lucan wrote, it is  the wounds left  
by  the hands of  a  neighbour that will not be forgotten (Kissane 2016: 
215).   
Hence  one   criterion for   judging a  conflict to  be   a  civil   war 
is  that    the   protagonists  should  have to  face  the   prospect of  
having to  live together in  the   future (Licklider 1995).  This   prospect 
involves  questions about the meaning  of the nation.  Civil war    
constitutes  a     trauma   for  members of   a society that    want, despite  
their  differences, to  live  together in one nation.   In Finland and Ireland 
specifically, the    occurrence  of  civil   war  at  the  precise   moment  
of  state        formation   made this issue acute. Both  wars     had  the    
capacity   to  bolster national  identity but   also    raised      questions 
about the  grounds on       which   the collectivity rested (Eyerman 2012:  
4). 
The subsequent   importance of   the  civil  war  to    Finnish  
national    identity  was  bound up  with   Finland’s  geo-political 
vulnerability vis a vis    Russia. This vulnerability, acute up to 1944, made 
the re-integration of the losers imperative.  In   such a context  the  
nation   should  be  seen  not  as    a dominant    discourse or    a 
composite of discrete traditions, but  as  an     underlying ‘code’   of  
meanings     pertaining  primarily to  issues of unity and disunity 
(Alapuro 2002: 172). In   Ireland,  there was    cultural   vulnerability  vis 
a vis   Britain,   but   no lasting   threat of re-occupation  (Cambell and 
Hall 2017: 71).  The    nation’s putative  Catholic    and  Gaelic   roots  
were   not at  issue in   the civil war, but     the       political   question of   
how to   achieve  full independence - by   force or   by  constitutional 
methods -  was. The   civil war  helped     re-establish   the   centrality 
of  this       cleavage and  the   organisation of  the  party  system    around 
the civil war parties kept it so (Hutchinson 2005: 108). 
In   Ireland, where the civil war was Green Against Green 
(Hopkinson 1988)   the criteria for   membership in the nation and  
national unity  was restored on the basis of shared cultural values.    In  
Finland, where   the shock  of  civil war  was  much  greater,  coming to   
terms with  the  past  involved a  cultural process  of  re-evaluation 
which extended  into the 1960s and later. There was a    need to    
narrate the     events  of  1918   in  a     new way.    A  recent   current in   
cultural sociology       considers  trauma, and  the  nation as   connected   
primarily  with    narration. Trauma     does    not   emerge naturally: 
painful   experiences must be translated into a narrative frame. In   
Finland          this narrative  frame  ultimately took  the   form of       a  
collective trauma.    ‘Cultural    trauma’ is a   discursive   process when 
the emotions that are   triggered by a traumatic   occurrence are 
worked through, and  an    attempt is  made to heal this collective    
wound (ibid, 8). This ‘working through’ has happened in Finland and 
the  result (unlike in Ireland) was that the societal meaning of the civil 
war became part of the national narrative.  
 
The civil wars 
It is Tilly’s (1975:  46)      observation that the later a state has become 
part of the European   state system, the       more likely it is to have 
been formed as a   consequence of wars between the older European 
states, or  from  negotiations  ending  those wars.  The Finnish   civil 
war of 1918 followed the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917, the  
Irish civil  war  the Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921. The Finnish 
conflict lasted from 27 January to 15 May 1918. Ireland’s lasted from 
June 28 1922 to April 24 1923. 
Finland had become a Grand Duchy of the Russian Tsar in 1809. 
It gradually built on this autonomy; and by 1914 a common national 
identity, economy and multi-party system had emerged. The Grand 
Duchy allowed      Finnish and Swedish speakers found common ground. 
In 1892 Finnish was made a national language alongside Swedish. 
Finland’s Diet had been reconvened in 1867, and following the 1905 
Revolution, the Eduskunta, a parliament elected on universal adult 
suffrage, was   established. The Social Democrats were the largest party 
from 1907 up to 1917.  
Ireland was incorporated into the United Kingdom in 1801. 
Movements demanding religious equality, political autonomy and land 
reform followed. The dominant mode of opposition was 
constitutionalist: the ‘Home Rule’    parties wanted a native parliament 
restored to Dublin, not absolute   independence. Most Irish Protestants, 
concentrated  in the North-East, opposed Home Rule.  At the same 
time, land reforms were establishing a Catholic proprietorship. The 
main cleavage among nationalists   was political: whether to trust in 
parliamentary methods or in physical force. After a failed rising in 
Dublin during Easter 1916 the second (republican) tradition became 
dominant.  
There are   many parallels between    their histories in the late 
nineteenth century (McMahon and Newby: 2017). A Finnish national 
identity was   promoted by the Fennomans since the 1860s, and a 
variety of   educational, labor, religious and temperance movements 
had   tried to raise    Finnish national consciousness. The intention  was 
to strengthen loyalty to the Grand Duchy, and the Finnish-speaking 
smallholder was idealized as the model citizen.  In Ireland, since the 
1890s, the Gaelic Revival had tried to shift the focus away from  
Westminster  politics and  onto the historic Irish community which had 
allegedly enjoyed a golden age before the arrival of British rule 
(Hutchinson 1987). Hence in  both countries cultural nationalists   built 
up a       positive image of the population, to be shattered by civil wars 
whose destructiveness was  blamed on the character of ‘the people’ 
(Hämäläinen 1979; O’ Callaghan 1984). 
The First World War had led to   growing radicalization. Neither 
country was a theatre of war, but British and   Russian troops were 
stationed on their respective territories. The War averted a conflict 
between Catholics and Protestants over Home Rule. The 1916 rising, 
the proclamation of the Republic, and the execution of fifteen leaders, 
transformed the conflict into one between the British state and Irish 
republicanism. Constitutionalism    became discredited. After its 1918 
general election victory,   Sinn Féin  demanded that Britain recognize 
an Irish Republic. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) also   began a war of   
independence in January 1919 which       continued until July 1921. 
Opposition    was strong only where Unionists were in the majority. 
Partition in 1920 placated them.  
Only after 1899 did    Russification  policies  disturb the tradition 
of Finnish accommodating Russian interests. The Eduskunta, was 
repeatedly dissolved, and no parliament had the authority to pass 
reforms demanded by the Left. With food shortages, land evictions, 
and unemployment, the Socialist movement radicalized. Reflecting the 
problem of rural poverty, about 14,000 evictions took place between 
1909 and 1915 (Peltonen 1995:  31-32). Yet the   Social Democrats    
could not use their parliamentary   majority to effect reform, and its 
leadership was losing control of the workers’ movement. The Social 
Democrats and the bourgeois parties   became divided over the 
former’s ‘Power Law’, making Finland politically independent, but 
leaving foreign policy to the Russians. The     Provisional Government 
ordered fresh elections in October 1917, in which the Social Democrats 
lost their majority. The  new  bourgeois  Senate declared independence 
on 6 December 1917, and proceeded to assert its authority over 
Russian troops in Ostrobothnia.  The Germans intervened on the White 
side in the civil war, which began on 27 January 1918.  
   Sinn Fein’s victory in elections in 1921 reinforced its claim to   
the whole island.  Yet it soon became divided between those for whom 
the Anglo-Irish Treaty signed on December 6 1921 was a sell-out, and 
those for whom it was ‘a stepping stone’ to independence. This Treaty 
gave 26 counties internal autonomy, but the ‘anti-treatyites’ objected    
to the continuance of   partition and the oath to the British Crown 
required of parliamentarians. The election on 16 June 1922 saw these 
Republicans lose their majority, and the Irish Provisional Government 
now claimed a mandate to implement the Treaty. The anti-treatyites 
rejected majority rule as a basis for adjudicating the Treaty issue, 
knowing that the majority would chose compromise.   
The Irish Provisional Government’s decision to attack the IRA on 
28 June 1922 followed an ultimatum delivered by the British 
government two days previously. The defeat of the IRA in Dublin 
enabled the   Provisional Government to project its   authority, labelling 
the IRA ‘irregulars’. With a    constant supply of arms from Britain, the 
National Army grew to over 50,000 men, and achieved a rapid victory 
in the war’s conventional phase. The Catholic Church strongly backed 
the government. Guerrilla resistance continued into April 1923, but 
reprisal executions and weak public support demoralized the IRA, 
which declared a cease-fire on 24 April 1923.  
The Finnish civil war was more conventional, with the reds 
(punaiset) first controlling the more urbanized south-west. The 
Bolsheviks supported them mainly through arms supplies. The white 
(valkoiset) counter-offensive in early March, supported by the German 
Army, was successful. White victories in the battles of Tampere and 
Viipuri, and German occupation of Helsinki ensured victory. Atrocities 
were common, but since most   lost their lives in prison camps – 
through cold, hunger, and executions – the reds suffered most. 
Memories of the red and white terrors lingered long. After its victory 
the Finnish senate decided to appoint a German crown prince as 
monarch in 1918. The German defeat however, meant that Finland 
became a republic – in 1919.  
The shock of civil war 
For   social  change to  be  traumatic,  Sztompka (2000: 452) 
argues that it must, firstly,   have a temporal quality: the change must 
be sudden and rapid. The Finnish and Irish civil wars   followed rapid 
changes in power relations between different    strands of their   
nationalist movements, which   meant  that  the nation suddenly 
became a zone, not just of conflict, but     of   civil war. The Finnish 
conflict  began  less  than  two   months after Finnish independence 
was declared. In Ireland just seven months elapsed between the 
signing of the Treaty   and the civil war.   
Secondly, social change must have a particular substance and 
scope: being radical, deep comprehensive; touching the core of 
society. In both     countries, divisions had    emerged over who      could 
further the nation’s interests but in Finland these divisions had 
profound social dimensions. The victors interpreted their civil war in 
national terms, as ‘a war of liberation’ (Vappausota) against leftist 
forces    contaminated by their exposure to the Soviet Union. The left, 
in contrast, interpreted the war in social terms, as a defence of the 
gains for the Social Democrats which had followed the October 
Revolution (ibid: 169). In  Ireland the   losers interpreted the civil war 
in national    terms, as a    continuation of the war of independence. 
The    pro-treatyites saw   the conflict      in social terms, as a defence 
of  majority rule  and  the property order  (Kissane 2005: 239). Yet 
because the process achieving full independence for the island was 
incomplete (and seen as unfinished business) the former interpretation 
prevailed.  The  names  ‘Free Staters’ versus ‘Republicans’ - compared 
to ‘Reds’ versus ‘Whites’ -   reflect the stronger social basis of the 
Finnish conflict.  
Thirdly, the change must have specific origins: it is perceived as 
imposed, exogenous, coming from the outside. White Finns claimed 
the    socialist movement had been contaminated by their exposure to 
Bolshevik   Russia. They  considered the ‘Reds’  ‘those who had lost 
their fatherland’. The  Irish conflict    also came ‘from the outside in’ 
and the   defeated side   had  to face  the fact   that  their  ‘nation’ 
seemed to have  been  defeated at  the  moment it  was  born.  The 
Free State, they argued, was  not Irish, not free,  but a puppet of British 
policy. Such   divisions revealed ‘The Madness Within’ (the title of a civil 
war documentary by RTE, the state broadcaster). 
Finally, the  change is  encountered  with  a particular mental 
force: it is perceived as unexpected, unpredicted, shocking, and 
repulsive. Since 1809 Finland had been a peaceful part of the Tsarist 
Empire. Nonetheless, the civil war produced casualty    rates 
comparable in per capita  terms to  the  Spanish  civil war (1936-39). 
Far   more    died as  a   result of executions (11,500) or from prison 
camp conditions (13,500) than were killed in battle (8,700 deaths) 
(Alapuro 2014: 22). The    casualties of the Irish civil war in 1922-23, 
less than 1500, were small  in comparison.  The   IRA avoided 
conventional fighting and many of its members did not take part in the 
guerilla war which began in August 1922.  
In   the  language of medicine  trauma    refers to    the impact      
of   a  sudden event on  the  body,  leaving it less  functional  than   before  
in  some crucial     respect. The Finnish  and     Irish conflicts   occurred 
at a  particular   moment in their historical  development, almost   
immediately  after   independence.  Since deep internal divisions 
emerged  the moment  legislative   independence had been achieved ,   
this timing   made  for  trauma  of  a   specific   kind. The      naturalistic  
approach  to  trauma is  of       events  that  befall  actors,  which    because 
of  their    suddenness and  brute  force radically overstrain    their  
capability to  respond (Joas 2005: 367).  
Homogeneity had long  been      regarded    as  a  positive  societal   
trait  which    made these wars  harder  to  comprehend. Finnish  and 
Irish nationalists did not   always  value  particular    interests as  the  
basis of political identity, but  in 1918 and 1922 different  actors had 
different views of a general   common interest. The   problem was that 
views of this general interest could differ in a way that made any 
negotiation between them difficult (Kettunen 2004: 293).    The 
struggle   over who had the right interpretation of ‘the people’ gave the 
Finnish conflict a particular bitterness (Liikanen 1995). And the word for 
people in Finnish (kansa) was also the word for nation. The  Irish  civil  
war was fought  between two wings of Sinn Féin and the IRA, both 
defending the rights of ‘the nation’ and both claiming to be 
representing the people’s will. 
Yet   homogeneity  continued to   be   the  basis for  nation-
building,  and  rapid  political reconstruction followed the civil wars. 
Ethnic markers –   language in   Finland, religion in   Ireland –     pointed  
to  larger  national   identities, distinct from   Russia or Britain  which  
each     side could share in.  Their formative experiences   remained a 
source of trauma,  but  shared identity  (combined with their 
vulnerability  as  small  states)   encouraged the political 
accommodation of the losers.   
 
The Political Accommodation of the Losers.  
 Both    civil wars found their     conclusion  in   amnesties  that  left  
questions  of innocence and guilt    aside. The   first step on   the road 
to national reconciliation was    not  forgiveness, but  the  hope   that, 
under the common roof of institutions,  relationships could heal on 
their own (Schlink 2010:   88).  The  roof  was  provided by   Dáil Éireann 
and the Eduskunta, parliaments which   were symbols of pre-war unity.    
The aim was to heal damaged relationships through ‘institutionalized 
encounters’ which made coexistence possible (ibid: 2010).   
Civil wars   demand  the   forcible establishment of unity, and 
there  can usually be only one dominant authority above the clashing 
interests (Bracher 1985: 113). Yet  Finland and Ireland continued with 
pluralism, which allowed the losers    back into the system. In Finland 
in 1918 an   amnesty was passed for those with shorter sentences, and 
further amnesties, also supported by the Social Democrats, followed in 
1921 and 1923.   The    Social Democrats pursued a policy of ‘class 
peace’ and worked for the consolidation of representative institutions. 
Such was their electoral strength that in 1919 they   again became the 
largest party in parliament, and controlled  160 localities (Haapala 
2008: 2). They were led by men like Väinő Tanner who had not 
supported the revolutionary attempt in 1917-18.  
Yet this comeback was   seen by some as   proof of the effete 
character of democracy. The quasi-fascist ‘Lapuas’, which emerged in 
1929, saw  themselves as   making a valiant attempt to safeguard the 
achievements of the civil war and     restore  the   white Finland that 
had emerged from it’ (Nevakivi, Jussila and Hentilä 1999: 155). They  
were  first   successful in collapsing the government. Fortunately, the 
victory of  the  conservative Svinhufvud at the 1931 presidential 
election led to the assertion of the rule of law the following year. 
Alapuro (2002: 174) argues that the Scandinavian social structure, with 
a free peasantry placing limits on the   exclusion of        working people, 
was the critical reason why the system did not shift to the right. The 
Agrarian Party had no sympathy for efforts to   extend the repression 
to the Social Democrats.      After it won a   presidential election in 1937, 
the Social Democrats entered into a coalition with them, based on  the 
protection of democracy and resistance to Fascism. This coalition 
between former adversaries stabilized politics (Karvonen 2000: 150-
51).  
The    Irish  Civil  War concluded with mass internment and 
reprisal executions. The    oath of allegiance was required of   
parliamentarians until 1933. However, the 1920s also saw the    
assertion of   civilian   authority during ‘the army mutiny’ of 1924, the 
‘civilianization’ of the    security apparatus, and the demobilization of 
most of the National Army (O’ Halpin 1999: 39-81).    A  general 
amnesty was   declared in November 1924. In    1926 anti-treaty  Sinn 
Féin     split       between those willing to take the oath and enter the 
Dáil, becoming Fíanna Fáil, and those remaining outside. Labour 
supported  a  minority   Fíanna Fáil   government in    1932.  Fíanna 
Fáil’s  leader, Éamon  de Valera, had declared the nation’s    most 
urgent need to be ‘internal peace’, but he also wanted to use the 
institutions of the Free State to achieve what they had lost in the civil 
war. Positive measures     included the abolition of the oath in 1933      
and a new     constitution in 1937, but      his government still proscribed 
the IRA in 1936.  
After a civil war those responsible for state-building have to 
consider  what  the  building-blocks  of   the  nation were. Alapuro 
(1988: 205)   contrasts two    strategies of integration, one based on an 
inter-class cultural-nationalist   community, and the other on national 
integration through conciliation. The first   approach implied the 
suppression of class differences, and the Finnish Socialist Labour Party, 
formed after the Civil War, was banned after having contested the 
1922 election. It contested the 1924, 1927 and 1929 elections as the 
Workers and Smallholders Party, but was banned again after 1929. The 
second, conciliatory, approach was espoused by the Agrarian Union 
and the National Progressives, and prompted the passing of land 
reform bills and amnesties for the rank-and-file Reds.  
  Ireland, where both sides drew heavily on the pre-1914 
traditions of cultural nationalism,  saw     the  reconstruction of the 
nation as an inter-class cultural community. The winners’ Cumann Na 
nGaedheal, governed until 1932, when Fíanna Fáil replaced it for 
sixteen years. Both parties had their origins in Sinn Féin.   Political 
parties   had been enormously important before independence 
because of the antagonism between the largely unionist holders of 
state power, and those nationalists that organized mass   opinion 
(Garvin 1981: 183). Fíanna Fáil continued  the     nineteenth-century 
pattern of standing  up to   Britain, but   both the civil war  parties 
furthered the pattern  of  establishing mass centralized organizations 
which cut across class and territorial cleavages (ibid: 216).  
Finland also   benefited from the integrative power of party 
politics. The Red  Green compromise in 1937 strengthened the sense 
that  internal class differences were legitimate and pointed to Nordic 
Social Democracy. Critiquing the application of a    conflict model to   
the  whole of    its   interwar politics,   Tepora (2014) argues  that  the  
first public acts of  reconciliation in Finland   actually took place in the 
late 1930s, and were favoured by the  Social Democrats. Yet up to 1944    
‘White Finland’, while  maintaining a   parliamentary form of 
government,  employed   repressive legislation to     drive the 
communists     underground. Its institutional symbol was    the      Civic 
Guard, a    paramilitary    organisation which existed     alongside the 
regular army, with   as many as 100,000 members (Nevakivi, Jussila and 
Hentilä 1999: 144). In the   Winter War (November 1939-March 1940) 
and the Continuation War (June 1941-September 1944) Finland  fought 
the  Soviet    Union, becoming the only former territory of the Tsar’s to 
keep its independence in the twentieth century.  
The   Finns  thus  faced    the specific   challenge of    
accommodating the  losers at a time   the Soviet Union was a threat to 
Finland’s   survival.  The    Communists, with their   ties to Moscow, 
were culturally marginalized and   could not operate openly until after 
1944 when their party was legalized. World War Two  gave the Finnish 
left a chance to demonstrate its   patriotism, an opportunity which it 
took. United in the winter and    Continuation   Wars, Finland began the 
integration of the Communists that year. The army and the   White 
Guards had been   divided over whether the threat   came from within 
(the radical left) of from without (Soviet Russia). That    the White 
Guards were made illegal   the same year as the Communists were 
legalised suggests that the second interpretation prevailed. 
 In Ireland   the integrative power of Irish nationalism was much 
stronger.    After the   civil war the society became dependent on strong 
centralised organisations (the Catholic Church, the Gaelic Athletic 
Association, and the Gaelic League) for the supply or moral and social 
cohesion. These bodies    were means of rapid societal re-integration 
and advocates of values both civil war sides supported. In contrast to 
the Finnish communists, the   unreconciled Irish   republicans in Sinn 
Féin and the IRA    did not become a dissident society, but    only ‘a 
dissenting current within Irish society’ (Bowyer Bell 1972: 224). They 
remained committed to a 32-county republic, but were not isolated 
socially or culturally. 
  Indeed a very traditional   consensus returned. The 1937   
constitution   made explicit many of the values of Catholic social 
teaching  that  Cumann na nGaedheal had  legislated for  in    office. 
The  1938 Anglo-Irish Trade Agreement heralded a joint commitment 
to an Irish economy consisting of a protected industrial sector 
combined with a dominant cattle-exporting agriculture, closely linked 
to Britain (Daly 1992: 94). Fine Gael's support for    Fíanna Fáil’s 1939   
Offences against the State Act, aimed at the   IRA, was   another sign   
of consensus. The powerful Catholic Church  propagated the idea of 
the nation as an inter-class community.  
Both countries’ vulnerability as two small nations had 
encouraged political compromise. The   difference     was    that       the  
Irish  division  was   accommodated into a   nationalist paradigm. 
Ankersmit (2002: 193-213) distinguishes between ‘consensus’, 
presupposing a commitment to    a predefined value system, and 
compromise   based  on  the  mutual recognition of the particular 
nature of the interests in question. In Finland consensus – on   
independence,     democracy, and   general    social reform – had been 
destroyed. Only     compromise could   produce stability. In contrast, 
the  Irish   civil war   division     was   primarily political and consensus    
was   easier to re-establish. The idea of the nation as an  inter-class 
community meant that internal differences -with Protestants and with  
Irish  Labour -  were downplayed.    The state   remained neutral in the 
Second World War, a policy supported by both civil war parties.  
Both cases    are     good    candidates for a state-centric approach 
to   reconstruction.    Wimmer’s (2012) work on the transition from 
Empire   suggests that     fresh rules of the game usually emerge in the 
new nation states which govern the treatment of minorities. The 
relative   success of Finland and Ireland was that the defeated 
minorities   were  enabled by  such  rules  to govern. Yet culturally,   
each side    should also   be able to   commemorate their   causes   in   
such a   way   that a divided society becomes a   community of fellow 
citizens (Hutchinson 2017: 74-75). The commemoration of the Irish 
state’s victory was   mute compared to that of the losers (Dolan 2003). 
The republicans had a richer and more powerful tradition of 
commemoration and after the 1932 election Fianna Fáil remained the 
dominant   party until 2011.  In Finland by  the 1930s more    than 350 
towns had erected monuments commemorating the fallen whites; 
there were only five official memorials in honour of the reds (Peltonen 
2002: 192). There was  a  greater need for cultural repair than in 
Ireland,  where     the losers’s had the cause of revolutionary 
nationalism on their side. 
Indeed   Finland    will    provide an   illustrative   example of   how 
a  civil war   can  lead to  a  cultural   trauma. With  its massive violence   
the    conflict had   delivered a great shock to   the Finns’ sense of     
themselves so there was      a  greater  need  to  ‘work through’ the   
conflict    culturally.  In terms  of  national  identity  the    civil   war  
would    also become ‘a dominant referent’, a     new meaning structure 
against   which   other events are    measured. This conflict’ had an  
exceptional status in the context of Finnish history and  fits   Eyerman’s 
(2001, 2)      argument  that    cultural trauma is a discursive   response 
to a tear in the social  fabric, where    the foundations of an established   
collective identity are   shaken by a  traumatic   occurrence, and  are left 
in need of re-narration or     repair.  
 
Narration and cultural repair. 
Post-conflict    reconciliation  requires  the  creation  of  a  common self-
image.  Finnish   and   Irish cultural     nationalists had  long  idealised  
the     peasantry, promoted language revival and   the  clergy    
supported the new states. There  was   cultural material for nation-
builders to  work with.  When   it came to    responses to   civil war 
however,   political   reconstruction proved sufficient in    Ireland: there   
was  no  visible  ‘coming to terms with   the past’. In Finland a cultural 
process   was  necessary  before the left      could be integrated in a 
positive   way.  While the   political accommodation of the losers  
occurred  quickly,  cultural and social reconciliation took more than half 
a century (Alapuro 2014). The  societal meaning of 1918 had to be 
brought into the national narrative. 
The Finnish   civil war had come ‘from the outside in’, but    was 
first incorporated   into   national  political    traditions by being 
regarded as a war of liberation. The victorious  whites promoted   the   
Civil War as a ‘freedom war’ (Vapaussota), preventing the 
incorporation  of Finland into Bolshevik   Russia. Their view was that 
the violence had been necessary in 1918 to complete the   process of 
gaining independence.   This  independence  had come about only as a   
consequence of the First World War, and the whites believed that 
nation-building   was incomplete in 1917. The roots of   independence   
were thought of as originating deep in the   past, and   the     white 
victory the   culmination of  a long-term development (Haapala 2008). 
This     narrative deepened the divide   with the    left, since it suggested     
they were Finns ‘who had lost their Fatherland’.   
The    absence of  transitional  justice made   narratives   
important. If  the    dominant   narratives about civil war are    wrong, 
the relations     between the actors have not been repaired. In cases 
where one side has     won, reconciliation is usually about   revising such 
dominant narratives and      producing narratives that address the 
complexity of   conflict,   stories which     acknowledge the suffering of 
all sides.   Váinő Linna’s trilogy of novels, Under the Northern Star  
(1959-1962), gave a   sympathetic account of the Reds for the   first time 
by stressing   their social grievances. Half a century after the civil war 
Linna’s trilogy    helped  integrate  the  Reds into  the  Finns’ sense of 
themselves. Only in       the 1960s did Finnish    historians begin to study   
the civil war    objectively. It was    then that historians uncovered the   
full scale of the white terror, and its organizational basis. Even if the last   
step on the road to reconciliation, public acknowledgement of the 
Left’s perspective allowed healing (Forsberg 2009).  
For the   ‘cultural trauma’   school   meaning is   not    inherent in    
what happens; trauma, like all forms of memory, is a matter of 
appropriation, negotiation,   of cultural struggle (Sundholm 2011). The   
point of  the    approach  is   not  to      deny  that events   matter, but 
to  recognise  that  there  is  selectivity at      work in  how people 
respond to events. One factor      that    promoted fresh thinking   in 
Finland was    that    the society was very divided on class lines, but  
needed  to    maintain     unity in     the face of    Soviet pressure. Friendly 
relations with the Soviet Union became official policy from 1944 on. 
And a change in the conception of democracy, to include social 
democracy took place after the war.  
Indeed  we   can  see these cultural     changes  - which took the  
political  re-integration of  the left in the  1930s  a step   further - as 
examples of ‘civil repair’,  a process   driven by carrier groups which  
engaged  the conscience of the   wider society (Eyerman 2001: 3). 
Wood  and  Debs (2013: 611) suggest  that   such   narratives of  
suffering can transform a group’s larger identity. Their  effect on  
national identity    stems  from  their      success in having an event   
acknowledged  as     a trauma, and becoming    the     exceptional event. 
If a trauma   resonates with the wider group it    becomes integrated 
into the collective identity.  
Writing of   the Slovak   and Czech intelligentsia after communism 
Eyal (2004: 7-8) outlines  two social roles for     intellectuals. The    
former   mainly saw their    role as one of maintaining   collective   
identity and   promoted the idea of the nation moving through time 
without  fundamental   change. This  was  true of  the  conception of 
the Finnish civil war as a war of liberation.  A very different ‘will to 
memory’ existed      among Czech intellectuals who    saw their role as 
one of overcoming trauma and     the dislocation and suffering it had 
brought.  The first   role   embeds intellectuals     in society as the 
guardians of collective memory and ethnicity; the   second makes them   
pastors of individual memory and conscience (ibid: 12). The  Finnish 
state has    embraced the        second approach. Its  currrent  project 
‘War Victims in Finland 1914-1922’ tries to gauge, as accurately as 
possible, the number of     people who were killed or executed in the 
civil war. The results, available on the national archive website, suggest 
that the state now sees detailed historical research as a way of dealing 
with a national trauma (Mirkkala 2012:  246). 
The   Irish civil  war  was also  traumatic for  those that had 
invested  so   much   hope  in   independence. Partition, which preceded 
the civil war in 1920,    was   cemented by the Boundary Commission in   
1925. In   a context of disillusionment with the fruits of independence, 
Flanagan (2015: 9) sees ‘a competitive dynamic’ between two sides 
that   shared   Catholic and militarist values. The Pro-Treaty cause has 
been justified in terms of   their contribution to state-building, their 
defence of democracy, or the eventual triumph of the ‘stepping stone’ 
approach to (Southern) Irish Independence (Curran 1986; Younger 
1965; Garvin 1996). The anti-treaty perspective    located the conflict 
in     an ongoing    revolutionary   process. Indeed in     Ireland it was the 
losers who believed that violence had been   necessary to protect 
independence in 1922. Dorothy   MacArdle’s (1937) best-selling The 
Irish Republic represented the republican  defeat  as an      interruption 
of a revolution. Later republican  historians (Gallagher 1965; Greaves 
1971) developed her view that  the civil war was not   something   new, 
but a continuation of a longer-term revolution.  
This approach has made it   difficult to establish a societal 
meaning for what happened in   1922-23. The labour agitation, 
sectarian  violence in Belfast, agrarian unrest, the   burning of more 
than one hundred and ninety mansions and  country homes (many 
Protestant-owned) (Clark 2014), and          the changed    role   of women    
did not find  their way into history until recently. The small and 
marginalised Irish left had little influence. On the one hand, the 
competition over  the  past   strengthened national identity  since the 
two parties had their roots in Sinn Féin. Yet it    marginalised the  
experiences of   those  for  whom the nationalist  revolution was not 
primary,  or of those  for whom it was regrettable.  It   was      
Hopkinson’s 1988        Green against Green that      boosted the     
empirical   study of   the       war’s complexity, particularly in terms of 
the spur to local   history. Some recent historians  (Foster 2014; Kostick 
1996) have applied class analysis to the conflict. 
On      both  sides  of the  Irish   split   the initial  narration of 
events, locating them in    centuries of resistance to British rule was 
also underpinned by ‘a powerfully  teleological concept of   time’ 
(Flanagan 2015: 9).  The   experience was   ‘transmissible’ (Benjamin 
1999: 97): the  conflict   could  be  integrated into a historical 
continuum linking the generations and consolidating the feeling of a 
common culture. Since one consequence of violent conflict is to 
destroy this sense of temporal flow, this    teleological  approach   made  
potentially  disorientating events familiar.  Bollas (2015: 169-181) has    
argued that after a psychotic episode   it is   important for    a patient 
to return to her ‘narrative core’. His    argument is that talking    about 
the past soon after a mental breakdown can help reverse the 
schizophrenic process because  it  implicitly   restores the narrative 
hegemony of the I. As   both  patient and  therapist    go  over the   
details of  the   recent past, ‘this act of   historicity  and   narrativity 
becomes the  glue that  restores  the self and  prevents  further  splitting 
and   fragmentation’ (ibid: 171). The Irish quickly returned to their 
narrative core and the result was that the experience of internal 
division became submerged in a larger story of constant  struggle 
against British rule.  
Being more of a rupture, the Finnish conflict could not be 
successfully restored in narrative or epic form, leaving those who 
suffered most abandoned to themselves. The white       narrative  had  
invalidated     the suffering of the left, who had no access to the 
emotions they experienced in 1918.  Cut off from public memory 
before the 1960s, this    made the work of cultural repair   more 
important. Decades of cultural exclusion had deepened  the  wounds 
of  civil war and made the task of cultural repair more important.   Bolas 
argues that   a   person in therapy  who is  not  encouraged  to  
historicise  his  past, may  be    revived by medication, ‘but he will  not 
be   the  person one could     have reached before this self-
abandonment  and fragmentation’ (ibid: 171).  
Cultural  sociology is    a useful tool for comparing these 
processes,   highlighting the  importance of narration and temporality 
in Ireland, and     showing  that  the   exploration  of   societal meaning 
can    become    part of coming   to   terms with a civil war. Because 
Finland was  a  class-based  society,   the political accommodation of 
the left eventually    led to  a  public  re-evaluation of  the  civil war.   
Ireland   did  not see a   strong  challenge from the left, and  the   
Catholic basis of the        inter-class community made for a different  
approach to internal divisions. It is also recently that  historians are 
investigating the war’s societal meaning.   Interestingly, comparative 
studies of    European civil war in  this  era   ignore   the  Irish  civil war 
entirely  (Diner 2008, Traverso 2016; Payne 2012). Some, citing the lack   
of massive violence against civilians, stress its uniqueness (Rodrigo 
2017). The Catholic basis of the inter-class community and the 
weakness of the left makes the Irish case seem exceptional. 
 
Why Finland? 
Why  did  the     Finnish civil war      become a      cultural trauma, 
whereas   the Irish conflict   never became a dominant referent in terms 
of national identity?  Differing  levels of violence   provide one 
explanation: 35,000 deaths   dwarf the less than 1,500 fatalities in 
Ireland.  Almost two thousand     people died in the battle for the 
industrial town of Tampere, (fought between 22 March and April 6 
1918), more   than in the  entire  Irish  civil war.       In       1998   a     
state-sponsored  project was      begun in   Finland which tried to 
identify as many as 40,000 people who lost their lives between 1914 
and 1922. Most  (nearly thirty  five  thousand)     were killed in the civil 
war (Alapuro 2002: 180). In Ireland, in 1986 a National Day of 
Commemoration was      inaugurated by the state, to commemorate all 
those who died fighting in wars in the twentieth century, including 
soldiers fighting for the British Army. A small minority of the lives lost 
were due to the civil war.  
Secondly, the  Finnish conflict was  exceptional in the context of 
Finnish history. Stenius (2012:  224-225) suggests  that  the    inability 
to   find consensus on     the     naming of   the Finnish civil war was due 
to  its more    ‘irreconcilable’ nature  than  in Ireland, where the civil 
war was     not the    greatest tragedy.  Before 1914 there had been no 
Finnish  tradition of political violence and the Finns were law-abiding 
subjects of the Russian Empire. The violence could not easily be 
incorporated into national traditions. The Finns  had never revolted 
against the Tsar (or the Swedes), and before Russification   nationalists 
did not usually accept analogies with the more radical (and Catholic) 
Irish nationalists (Newby 2017: 180).  
In Ireland   divisions between constitutional and militant   
nationalists were not new in 1922. A     huge cottage industry grew 
around creating biographies of the rival nationalist leaders, Eamon de 
Valera and Michael Collins, who embodied the fusion of constitutional 
and militant tendencies.  Today the     civil war is generally narrated, 
not   as an exceptional event, but as the   tragic denouement of the War 
of Independence. Two  recent Hollywood  films Michael Collins, and 
The Wind that Shakes the Barley  begin with the War against the British 
(1916-1921) and   end with  the tragedy of civil war. Most 
contemporary histories   share this chronology.  
Thirdly, the fact that many Finns   seemed   supportive of      
socialism in 1917 meant that their revolution was harder to   absorb 
into      existing   conceptions of the nation. Given the proximity of the 
Soviet Union it was an ‘Incomprehensible’ revolutionary attempt 
(Alapuro 2014: 19-22).  For  the names used for the civil    war, the 
Social Democrats’ preference was for ‘kansalaissota’ (peoples’ war) 
while the communists preferred ‘luokkasota’ (class war). The neutral 
term ‘sissällisota’, preferred by some Social Democrats, translates as 
‘internal war’ (Alapuro 2002: 172). All are societal   categories. It is  as  
if      the Finnish   conflict   released a   stronger   symbolic charge into 
society because it was a social conflict  (ibid: 17).  Its social roots    had  
been    evident before 1918, when the politics of   agrarian agitation    
was     much more influenced by socialist ideas    than in Ireland 
(Suodenjoki 2017).    The Irish        were initially   more       interested in    
nationalist    narratives.  P. S. O’Hegarty’s pro-treatyite    (1924)  The 
Victory of Sinn Féin and MacArdle’s (1937) republican The Irish 
Revolution, both presented the civil war  as an episode  in  the  move  
toward independence. Two histories in the 1960s (Neeson 1966; 
Younger 1965) continued the pattern. It is fair to say that this remains 
a  submerged conflict. Situated between the two struggles against 
British rule (1916-1923 and 1969-1998) it  is under-researched and a 
societal reading of what happened is harder to advance.  
The concept of a cultural trauma consists of an emotional    
experience   and  an   interpretive reaction. On  the  one  hand, the Red 
and White terrors placed a greater burden on memory. Yet    neither 
did the Finns    have   the       interpretative  tools to    come to   terms 
with this violence. For   Eyal   (2004: 10-11) trauma stands for 
psychological pain so powerful,  …. that it   becomes   impossible to   
localise in   a sequence of events. Real trauma   questions  the linear   
and progressive   temporality of  the  nation in a way that did not 
happen in Ireland.  We        normally  ask of    traumatic  violent events 
whether they are    characterized by a certain ‘non-assimilability’: by    
the enormous difficulty for the   sufferer to    integrate them into the 
framework of interpretation at their disposal (Joas 2005: 368). By most 
standards the Irish conflict was more     ‘assimilable’.  Had  the       Irish   
Free State      executed, not 81, but   more  than 10,000 IRA men, while   
another 10,000 died in    camps, the  state’s subsequent  approach to 
the past  would  have been  different. In   Finland the  amount of  blood 
spilt by the Whites was never going to be forgotten.    
 
Memory and Reconciliation.  
The        process  of  coming to  terms       with the Finnish civil war  
reflects  the   workings of    ‘cultural memory’   and  was   part of  the     
search for  unity    under    the Russian   threat, a quest which had been 
violently  interrupted in 1918  but carried on    after 1944. Finnish       
changes in   attitudes  towards the civil war   are also  consistent  with    
the  view that   shifts in cultural   memory take  time   and come from 
below (Sierp 2014: 10-12). Sundholm (2011)   says that no   meanings 
are  inherent in the   event, but   says of Finland in 1918 that some 
events are so horrible that it takes an   extensive time-span to 
appropriate them.   And      one    reason the      integration of the left 
required    cultural    work   was  that the  Finnish working class –with  
its   own educational, sporting and welfare institutions – was    culturally 
isolated after the civil   war. In a society with deep social segregation 
theirs  had  been  a case of   ‘negative integration’, symbolised by  the 
Social Democrat Premier   Tanner taking the salute as Prime Minister at 
a    commemoration of the  White  Victory in 1927 (Kirby 1979:  96). In 
contrast, de Valera was enabled by his electoral success to introduce a 
new constitution in 1937 symbolizing a rejection of the Treaty 
settlement. 
 Ireland in  contrast, provides    a   good   example of   the 
construction  (from above) of   political memory,    a type of memory       
tied, not  so much  to  trauma, but    to   ongoing  political  projects 
(Sierp 2014: 11).  Of  the      three  first  civil   war    histories,  one author    
(Dorothy MacArdle) was   personally   close to  de Valera, another (P.S. 
O’ Hegarty)  was  a   prominent  pro-treatyite who became a senior civil 
servant, while  William O’ Brien, was  a famous nationalist politician 
who   interviewed de  Valera  during the  civil  war.1 This political 
memory has nonetheless been very stable, one reason being that 
Fíanna Fáil: the   Republican Party   has long competed electorally with 
Fine Gael: the United Ireland Party.  
In   what  sense did the    Finnish conflict become a unifying 
cultural trauma? There   was      a       discernible improvement in    the   
relations  of    parties formerly in    conflict. And   this     improvement 
                                                     
1 O’Brien’s The Irish Free State: a secret history of its foundation’ was never published. It is held in the 
National Library of Ireland, Ms 4210. 
was  the   result of    satisfactorily  dealing with   the legacies of  the    
past (Radzick and Murphy 2015). Yet    reconciliation did still  not result 
in   an     agreed  interpretation of  the  civil   war. The  Mannherheim 
Museum in Helsinki still refers to the civil war as a liberation war.  
Finland   had  stabilized  in   the 1920s  and    1930s  by  establishing two 
‘blocs’ which    institutionalized  civil war   differences at   the  heart of  
political   life. Truth     was   not necessary for   this    process,   and 
Finland     became   ‘a   land of two historical truths’ as    a result (Haapala 
2008). In   2016 the   Finnish  broadcaster  Yle carried  out  a  survey of 
400 Finns on their attitudes towards the civil war; memories   remained  
sharp and  divided, even within families  (Uutiset 15 May 2016). 
 In  this    context  reconciliation   meant  only an   acceptance    
that rival    perspectives on the civil war were legitimate and the 
creation of an interpretive space in which  they could co-exist. These   
perspectives   brought historical   ‘clarity’ more  than     ‘truth’ to the 
past.  Alapuro  has     commented  that  so   complex was the Finnish 
civil war  that    any  conceptualization of  it  is likely to be   partisan.2 
                                                     
2 ‘Interpretation of the Finnish Civil War of 1918’, https://vimeo.com/30476075. 
His    comment  raises  the   philosophical  question   of  whether    
complexity is    a reflection of  the  event  itself, or  of the   way it  
becomes  assimilated   into  historical memory over time. Either way, 
when explaining such  wars,  ‘perspective’ and ‘knowledge’ become 
almost identical terms (Ortega y Gasset 1967: 44). 
The   approach   most    conducive to national   reconciliation  was    
not   the positivist   one of   establishing which set of propositions  about 
1918 were   factually  correct. Rather knowledge consisted in the   
continual  search  for   better     interpretations. Coming  to  terms  with 
a  civil  war  past   consisted rather    of a hermeneutic broadening of 
the known context    so   that  a   fuller understanding was reached 
(Cohn 2002: 49). What    gets in   the    way of this process    is any    
narrowing of  the     context to  the   civil war so  that    one   
interpretation emerges as the truth. And    each      generation is    
entitled to its own interpretation.  
Will  the   Irish  state   adopt this approach  when it  
commemorates   the hundredth   anniversary of its   civil war in 2022?  
In   an  implicit  reference to  the  civil     war, current President Michael 
D. Higgins  has called for an ‘ethics of memory’,  enabling  ‘different  
versions of  the  same   events to be placed side  by side, uncomfortable 
truths to be acknowledged’.3  As it stands,    the civil war    remains    
submerged in  cultural    memory between the earlier   War of 
Independence   and the    later Northern Ireland Troubles.  The latter 
conflict has helped    ‘shut down’  discussion of the Civil War of 1922-
23  in   a state many of   whose problems had   been set by  earlier acts 
of violence (Keane 2017: 16). And it has been   difficult for historians to  
consider the   legacy of earlier  conflicts without being influenced by 
the  Northern conflict (Regan 2013). The   societal meaning of  1920- 
1923 remains obscured by the pivotal role the civil war played in 
southern Irish state and nation-building.     
For  Newman (2015: 9) the   societal meaning of a civil war may 
also reflect    its place in  a larger  cycle  of conflicts. The first step  in 
terms of broadening perspectives on the Irish  civil war  is  to   clarify  
its relationship with the  earlier War of   Independence, (1919-1921), 
the contemporaneous  violence in  Northern   Ireland (1920-1922) and  
                                                     
3 Acceptance speech on being re-elected President, Dublin Castle, 28/10/2018, RTE News. 
the  later Northern Irish troubles (1969-1998).  If the    earlier conflict 
was  a   larger    Irish civil war (1913-1923) , the  narrative of an uplifting 
war of  national liberation after the 1916 Rising   is hard to sustain. If 
the   violence     which took place  in Northern Ireland after partition in 
1920 was   part of ‘the Irish civil war’,   the  legitimacy of the Irish Free 
State becomes   less central to the analysis. And if the Northern    
Troubles  were a sign that the IRA had not accepted its defeat in 1922-
23, the Irish civil war did not end in 1923.  
These   issues show  the    civil war   burdening  memory in a very  
political way. And  the  northern   Irish peace process      has     brought   
Sinn Féin back  into   the  competition over the past. When   in 2016 the 
Irish    state staged its commemoration of the 1916   Easter Rising   Sinn  
Féin organized  its  own events as it had done since 1923. The  
committee of  historians   appointed   to  advise the government on  the  
current ‘decade    of  commemorations’  commented  that  the  state  
should not be expected to be  neutral about  its own origins.4  So while 
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Irish political   memory has  long been    more    attuned to    politics,   
commemoration could   reproduce  the   trauma  of    state   formation.   
The  civil war did not crystallize much  that  was  new      about 
Irish national identity:  it revealed  more about the capacity for 
statehood. On  the one hand,  a stable democracy was constructed. Yet 
this achievement    ‘was based on a decision not to settle accounts’ 
(Walsh 2015: 427).   Journalist Justine McCarthy  (Times on  Sunday  
2017) argues   that if the      Irish state was  a  person it   would be   a    
psychological head-wreck, unable to get a  handle on  its     own identity 
because it has   spent its entire existence in denial about its origins. Two 
days   before the 1932       changeover, the     Minister of Defense, 
Desmond FitzGerald, instructed his   civil servants to destroy   sensitive 
material relating to the state’s 81  civil war executions. Not a single 
academic article has yet been published about them. 
A  common    European    response to  the   experience  of civil 
war  has  been  for    a ‘thin’ political  accommodation to take place first; 
a  ‘thick’ reconciliation - involving truth and justice - takes more     time. 
This was also      the Finnish sequence.  The   non-emergence of a 
cultural  trauma  in Ireland   could be taken  to be a    proxy  for avoiding  
issues   which  the political elite  finds  inconvenient. The    path to  
peace –  political accommodation of the losers   without   a thick 
reconciliation involving truth and justice – goes against   the  tenets of  
the  transitional justice literature.  In  this  sense it  is the  Irish, not the 
Finnish case    which is exceptional.   Yet perhaps      the  transitional 
justice literature, which stresses the benefits to society of openly 
dealing with the past it too universal in application. Its’  ‘politics of time’ 
is   future-oriented,    and   mechanisms     such as truth commissions 
are  intended to   mark a   break   with the past  (Bevernage 2010: 113). 
Yet a   society   which     conceives  itself as continuous in time   may  
have to change its identity in order to openly account for the   past. 
Such a change will be   resisted (Vernon 2012: 88-111).  For  whatever 
political motives Irish elites have had   in constructing memories of the    
civil war    they clearly   have not been able to       ‘write the past out of 
the present’ (ibid).  
 
Conclusion 
This   article   began with the     reflection that there   is little work on 
the role of     national identity in  post-civil war   reconstruction and 
reconciliation, a   judgement that   does not apply to work on ethnic 
conflict. It   posed the question of whether     re-integration was   
possible on   the    basis of  an  existing national   identity. In Finland 
and  Ireland   it   was, and the   political   re-integration of the losers 
happened  relatively quickly. When      we     consider the question of 
what    has to happen to make    that    identity more inclusive, I have 
highlighted the role of narration in   historicizing the Irish civil war and 
in bringing   cultural repair to the class divisions of Finland.  
These  countries       responded to the trauma of civil war in 
different ways. In   explaining the   contrast, the  civil war  experiences 
provide  the   independent  variable; the subsequent emergence (or 
not) of   cultural trauma is  the  outcome  that  needs    explanation. 
Both    conflicts    could   have    suggested that  the  nation-state    was   
not   the     end-point  of nationalism. Yet     the  Irish  were  able  to  
localise what       happened in   a   sequence of developments:  for both 
sides  1922 was part of  the story of  an unfinished  nationalist 
revolution. With its     greater  violence, class  hatred, and  deadly  prison  
camps the Finnish civil war  marked  more    a  fissure in  the  chain of  
events and needed  rethinking. Hence  the  cultural   trauma which 
followed.    
The     novelist  Karen  Blixen (1957)  once  remarked   that  ‘all 
sorrows  can  be  borne  if  you   put  them   into      a story  or tell a 
story about them’. Her    comment gets  to   the   essential  difference 
between  the   two  cases, and can be understood    in terms of the 
continuing hegemony  of   nationalist  storytelling in   Ireland. The   
stories  about     the     revolutionary  past   constitute a ‘transmissible’ 
experience, in the  sense of  the   Irish   revolution  being a  founding   
experience for  the    traditions of a Catholic    community that is    still 
able to find  in the  struggles of the past the materials that weave 
together the elements of    its  present  existence (Benjamin 1970: 
1999). Protestants,  north and  south, remained outside  this narrative. 
In contrast, the   Finnish  civil war  was    not  transmissible:  being    a 
shock to    the dominant   conceptions of nationhood,  it left  the 
defeated   side   outside the national story for half a century.  Hence 
the longer and   more  difficult  challenge of  absorbing the  conflict  
into Finnish national identity.   
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